Détente

=**__Détente__** = = //Gary and Paul// =

· Détente is the relaxing of tensions between nations, usually through political agreements and negotiations. · The period of détente during the Cold War began in the early 1970’s between the United States and the Soviet Union. The East and West were amassing large arsenals of nuclear weaponry and both sides were becoming more and more fearful of a full scale nuclear war.

__Reasons for détente:__ · Fear seemed to be one of the greatest reasons for détente. · Because of the fear of a nuclear war, the United States of America and the USSR began to slow their nuclear military progress. The USSR did so because it “was finding the expense of keeping up with the Americans crippling” (Lowe, 162) to its economy. · On the American side of things, congressmen and senators realized the futility of their military push to destroy communism. · The Chinese government was worried about the intentions of the United States after what they had witnessed in Vietnam and “were anxious about their isolation (Lowe, 162). China had a small stockpile of weapons in comparison to the USA and USSR. In addition, relations between the Soviet Union and China were worsening. In what way were they worsening?

What are some specific examples that show how tensions were relaxing? To what extent we detente "real"? (How deep was it? Did tensions really relax, or was it just superficial? Why did detente end?

__Paper 1__

//Extract from// **//The Soviet Union and detente of the 1970s,//** //Vladislav Zubok, 2008.//
 * SOURCE A**

Soviet detente policies and the nature of Kremlin’s international behaviour in the 1970s remain a controversial topic. Some authors argued that the Soviet Union was genuinely interested in detente as a combination of cooperation with confrontation, the best one could achieve during the Cold War. Others claimed that the Soviet Union, unlike the gullible West, masterfully used detente for inexorable expansion and military superiority. Critics of detente pointed to the unchanging nature of Soviet military doctrine, growth of military arsenal, expansion in the Third World and, above all, to the messianic ideological goals of the communist regime. After the end of the Cold War the second viewpoint became almost a common wisdom among the broader American public. In contrast, in Western Europe the majority of analysts never subscribed to it. In my opinion, it is inadequate to analyze the Soviet side of detente in the classic ‘realist’ mode, as if the Soviet Union were a unit with rational, understandable sets of interests and policies. Soviet diplomacy should be analyzed as a ‘two-level game’ of international affairs and domestic politics. Even more helpful is a broadly understood ‘constructivist’ approach that takes into account the evolution of Soviet regime, its ideology, economic and foreign policies, as well as the personalities of decision makers. 3 Moreover, the history of detente, especially its Soviet side, should not be studied only as a diplomatic history. Scholars should not pretend that the detente of the 1970s was just a complex game between two hostile blocs and the two superpowers. Instead, it should be treated as part of the global history at the moment of its epochal transition: when the rise of Soviet communism stopped, and the collapse of the Soviet bloc began.

**SOURCE B**

//Extract from **Detente and Domestic Policies**, Julian E. Zelizer, 2009, Oxford.//

But the foreign policy of détente drowned in the turbulent waters of domestic politics in the 1970s. Nixon’s and Ford’s national security centrism failed to create a stable political majority within the Republican party. The political weakness of each president as well as contradictions in their policies exposed them to domestic attack. At the same time, Soviet aggression undermined their ability to deliver on the promise of détente. Politicians allied with the conservative movement took advantage of presidential vulnerability to move national security politics toward the right. Each president ran head first into two factions in the burgeoning conservative movement, both of which rejected moderation: neoconservatives, who were Democrats disaffected with the leftward drift of their party as a result of the 1960s; and hawkish Republicans, who were rooted in the anticommunist politics of the early Cold War.

**SOURCE C**

=== Extract from “ Ping-Pong Diplomacy Spearheaded U.S.-Chinese Relations”. ===

===http://www.america.gov/st/peacesec-english/2006/April/20080522121040WRybakcuH0.8632013.html ===

On April 10, 1971, nine American players, four officials, and two spouses, accompanied by 10 journalists, crossed a bridge from Hong Kong into mainland China to usher in the age of "Ping-Pong Diplomacy." The eight-day adventure signalled a joint desire to relax old tensions between Washington and Beijing. "You have opened a new chapter in the relations of the American and Chinese people," Premier Chou En-lai said during a banquet for the visiting Americans in the Great Hall of the People in Beijing. "I am confident that this beginning again of our friendship will certainly meet with majority support of our two peoples." That same day, April 14, the United States lifted a 20-year-old trade embargo against China. U.S. relations with China had ended in October 1949 when communist forces led by Mao Zedong overthrew the Nationalist government led by General Chiang Kai-shek. Chiang and his government took refuge in Taiwan, and no American group had been allowed inside mainland China in the 22 years since the communist takeover. So it was completely unexpected when on April 6, 1971, the U.S. table tennis team, in Japan for the 31st World Table Tennis Championships, was invited by the Chinese team to an immediate, all-expense paid visit to the People's Republic of China. From April 11 to April 17, the U.S. team played the Chinese team in exhibition matches, visited the Great Wall and Summer Palace outside of Beijing, met with Chinese students and workers, and attended social events in China's major cities. A year later the Chinese players toured the United States, playing a series of "Friendship First" exhibition matches before enthusiastic U.S. audiences.

//President Richard Nixon shaking hands with Mao Zedong in 1972 during his visit to China.// //http://media.economist.com/blogs/democracyinamerica/mao%20nixon.JPG//
 * SOURCE D**

**Source E**

//Extract from **Detente: A Victim of Mutual Suspicion**, a newspaper article written by Peter Osnos, November, 1977.//

There are, of course, a multitude of explanations for what went wrong. On my list are: · Detente was oversold by Richard Nixon in an effort to distract attention from Watergate, and then disillusionment set in. · A powerful alliance of secularity-minded conservatives and human rights liberals in the United States whipsawed Kissinger as alternatively soft and cynical. · The Russians, being Russians, pressed or advantages in places like Angola (where they succeeded) and Portugal (where they did not), thereby cutting the ground out from under those in Washington who contended that Moscow would act responsibly. · Military-industrial lobbies in both countries continued to pursue their vested interests in expanded outlays for defense. I leave it to geopolitical pundits to assess the strategic implications of issues like the latter two listed. The arguments want to stress are more the matters of attitude. It was unfortunately, I believe, U.S. antagonism to detente, those endless debates over one and two-way streets, whether we were duped in this deal or that, which was instrumental in eventual collapse.

__Questions:__

1. (a) Examine sources C and explain the importance of “ping-pong diplomacy” to the policy of détente.

(b) Does the image in source D exemplify a positive or negative outcome to ping-pong diplomacy?

2. To what extent do the explanations expressed in source E support or counter those expressed in source A?

3. With reference to their origin and purpose, assess the value and limitations of source A for historians studying the Soviet side of détente.

4. Using the sources provided and your own knowledge of the topic, critically analyze détente. Are the views expressed in source B correct in assuming that détente failed completely?